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This paper describes how governments and philanthropic donors could drive innovation through a new 
kind of technology contest. We begin by reviewing the history of technology prizes, which operate 
alongside private intellectual property rights and public R&D to accelerate and guide productivity growth 
towards otherwise-neglected social goals. Proportional “prize rewards” would modify the traditional 
winner-take-all approach, by dividing available funds among multiple winners in proportion to measured 
achievement. This approach would provide a royalty-like payment for incremental success. The paper 
provides concludes with a specific example for how such prizes could be implemented to reward and help 
scale up successful innovations in African agriculture, through payments to innovators in proportion to 
the value created by their technologies after adoption.  





1.  INTRODUCTION 
Innovation is the wellspring of economic growth, but it is extremely difficult to obtain. By definition, it 
involves the creation of something that does not yet exist. Promoting innovation for African farmers has 
proven especially challenging, due to a wide variety of technological and institutional obstacles. This 
paper examines a new kind of intervention designed to help innovators overcome these hurdles and 
accelerate the spread of new production, storage and transport or processing methods targeted to the 
requirements of African farmers.  The urgent need for appropriate new farm technologies in Africa has 
been emphasized by the World Bank (2008) in the World Development Report 2008, the African 
governments’ own NEPAD (2005) in the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme 
(CAADP), and in many previous analyses (e.g. Masters 2005).  
Numerous papers address the question of how best to accelerate and guide innovation, as 
surveyed for example by Scotchmer (2004). Most of these analyses focus on how patents and other 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) motivate private investment in new technologies.
1  A related area of 
research concerns the design of grants, contracts, public-private partnerships and other payment 
mechanisms used by governments and philanthropic donors to complement private investment. In this 
paper, we focus on the role of ex-post prizes, a class of incentive used by both private investors and 
public funders. We offer a brief history of prizes for new technology, analyze the conditions under which 
each kind of funding mechanism can best meet funders’ needs, and propose a specific new kind of 
proportional prize program that we call “prize rewards.” 
Ex-post prizes are used when a funder announces the intention to reward a particular type of 
breakthrough, and later makes payment to whoever succeeds in meeting the prize criteria. Prizes typically 
operate alongside IPRs and other mechanisms, seeking to complement them and improve their 
effectiveness. Some prize contests elicit innovations that are themselves patentable, or help promote 
patenting. A remarkable example is provided by Brunt, Lerner and Nicholas (2008), who use a detailed 
dataset of historical prize offerings from the Royal Agricultural Society of England (RASE) to show that 
fields targeted for prizes attracted more patented innovations than fields for which prizes were not 
offered. The positive effect of prizes on patenting was observed even when the target for prizes was 
determined by simple rotation, and could not have been chosen in response to pre-existing innovative 
activity. The estimated size of the prize effect on patenting was quite large:  doubling the amount of prize 
money available in RASE contests for a given field was associated with up to 33 percent more patents 
granted in that field in subsequent years. Of course, not all of the technologies elicited by prizes turn out 
to be patentable. Some may be marketed without patents, and some may be spread through non-market 
mechanisms. Prizes work equally well for patentable as non-patentable technologies, and so complement 
rather than replace other funding mechanisms.
2   
In this paper, we begin by reviewing how prizes have helped jump-start innovation for many 
kinds of technology in Europe and North America over the past 300 years. We then provide a typology of 
funding mechanisms and the technology categories for which they are best suited, and identify the 
strengths and limitations of various kinds of prizes. Finally, we show how some of these limitations could 
                                                      
1  An overview of how IPR policy can be formulated to promote international development is provided by the Commission 
on Intellectual Property Rights (2002). An example of a specific reform proposal to favor developing countries is found in the 
Foreign Filing License concept of Lanjouw (2002).  
2 In a few cases, governments have tried to use prizes as a replacement for other funding approaches. As shown in this 
paper, however, the one-off nature of prizes makes them poorly suited to this task; we argue that prizes are best used to attract 
and inform the allocation of other funds, not to replace them. Notable attempts to use prizes instead of IPRs, grants and contracts 
include the invention reward system of the Soviet Union (Hughes, 1945; Kremer, 1998), and the “patent compensation” paid by 
the United States for nuclear technologies under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (Hay, 1958; Galane, 1952). There are some 
current proposals to use prizes instead of other funding mechanisms for pharmaceuticals in the United States (e.g. Senate Bill 
2210 introduced by Senator Bernie Sanders in October 2007), but our analysis suggests that a more promising approach would be 
the prize programs sketched by the National Academy of Science’s Committee on the Design of an NSF Innovation Prize (2007) 
and by Kalil (2006). Some of those prizes might benefit from using the proportional-payment feature described in this paper.  2 
 
be overcome with proportional payments, in which funds are distributed to many winners in strict 
proportion to their degree of success. A proportional-prize approach is particularly suited to help meet the 
needs of African farmers. For that purpose we propose a specific way to implement prize rewards, to 
recognize and reward value creation from new technologies after their adoption by African farmers. A 
similar approach could be used in other settings, offering incremental payments at the margin to reward 
increased effort towards whatever measurable goal is specified by the funder.  
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2.  WHAT PRIZES HAVE BEEN USED? A BRIEF HISTORY OF  
TECHNOLOGY CONTESTS 
Prizes are among the oldest instruments used to define success, elicit effort and identify promising 
candidates capable of achieving difficult tasks. Since antiquity, governments, philanthropists and private 
investors have used award contests, such as military competitions in ancient Greece, chariot races in 
ancient Rome, and so forth. Contemporary technology has been influenced by prizes since the 18
th 
century. Figures 1 and 2 provide a visual history, summarizing a search of the historical literature as 
described in Masters (2006) and extended in Pelletier (2007), drawing also on Knowledge Ecology 
International (KEI, 2008). The figures document all major contests for specific new technologies made in 
Europe or North America for which we could identify a particular funder, purpose, prize amount and 
eventual winner (if any). The awards in our list include only the largest prizes for pre-specified 
breakthroughs, not routine awards or those given for general professional and artistic achievement.  
Detailed information on each prize is appended to this paper in Table A1, in chronological order. 
The list of prizes is astonishing in the diversity of topics and funders involved. Figures 1 and 2 reveal 
patterns in the data, showing that there are bursts of contests at a particular time, with wide variations in 
prize values. In the figures, each prize is shown as a line, whose start date and length along the horizontal 
axis shows when the prize was offered, and whose vertical position shows its approximate value after 
conversion into 2006 US dollars. For obvious reasons, the vertical axis is not drawn to scale. The values 
range from very small (often much less than $50,000) to very large (over $2 million in the pre-1930 
period, and over $1 billion today). Prizes are numbered for cross-referencing to Table A1. The figures 
reveal that there are often clusters of contests in similar fields offered by similar funders, but once success 
in that field is achieved, the prizes are typically replaced by other funding mechanisms. Only a few prize 
offers remain in place for very long.  
Figure 1 presents technology prizes from 1700 to 1930. The 18
th and 19
th centuries were marked 
by a few very successful prizes in Europe, first in pursuit of ways to measure longitude at sea (denoted 1 
and 2; described at length in Sobel, 1995 and Davidian, 2005), and then a series of French prizes in 
industry and medicine (e.g. 5, 6 and 7). A remarkable case was the initially small sum that was increased 
to a very large prize offered for a remedy to the devastating Phylloxera outbreak of the late 19
th century 
(denoted 23; described in Campbell, 2005). The early 20
th century saw an even greater burst of prizes for 
breakthroughs in transportation and civil aviation, often financed by newspapers and other third parties 
not directly involved in the transportation or aviation sectors (Schroeder, 2004). This period ended with 
the most famous of the aviation prizes: an award for solo transatlantic flight from New York to Paris that 
was and financed by Raymond Orteig, a Franco-American hotel owner in New York, and won by Charles 
Lindbergh in 1927 (denoted 39 in Figure 1).  
A notable aspect of these awards is their link to other sources of funding. Prize-seekers 
consistently invested as much as (or even more than) the prize itself in pursuit of the award. Competitors 
often pursued prizes using techniques and resources they had developed for other purposes, and added 
substantial new investments targeted specifically at the prize criteria. For example, Raymond Orteig 
offered a prize of $25,000 (almost $300,000 in 2006 adjusted dollars), and Charles Lindbergh spent about 
as much as he won. The eight other teams competing for the prize spent even more. Collectively, the 
contestants spent about 16 times the sum offered by Orteig. Some contestants might have invested more 
than they could possibly win out of vanity or foolishness, but the historical record suggests that the 
contestants’ investments often paid off. Each prize contest offered not just a cash award, but also an 
objective and trustworthy test for demonstrating the performance of a contestant’s approach, thereby 
opening up a much larger market for their product. Prize sponsors were often not themselves engaged in 
the same market as that of the prize objective, but may have stood to gain from the contest itself and from 
the growth of that market.  For example, Orteig could have benefited from additional guests coming to his 
hotels in response to publicity from the prize, and also from the eventual growth of transatlantic travel.  
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Figure 1. A visual history of technology inducement prizes, 1700-1930 
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Figure 2 shows the major technology prizes offered from 1930 to 2007, with dashed lines 
indicating awards that remained unclaimed in 2007. After Lindbergh won the Orteig prize in 1927, far 
fewer prizes were offered, typically for non-commercial applications in fields such as human-powered 
flight, math and computing. In Europe and North America, commercial technology development 
proceeded without many further prizes, under the guidance of the patent system and rapid growth of 
public research and development (R&D) institutions that are funded through government grants and 
contracts. In the case of aviation, demand for the services of aviation prize contestants, such as Lindbergh, 
came through government contracts for military and postal services, as well as the needs of civilian 
aviation, which operated with some patent protection.  
In the 1980s, prizes were rediscovered as a major instrument for stimulating commercial 
innovation. This trend is reviewed in Bloch et al. (1999), among others. Figure 2 shows the dramatic 
nature of the rebound in technology innovation prizes, including a very dense cluster of prizes aimed at 
opening up large commercial markets in various fields. Almost all of these are lump-sum prizes, but two 
pioneering efforts involve incremental payments linked to quantities sold. An early example of this type 
of a variable prize payment was the US Super-Efficient Refrigerator Program (SERP), denoted prize 
number 55 in Figure 2. The SERP contest was initiated in 1990 by a consortium of refrigerator 
manufacturers in collaboration with the US Environmental Protection Agency (Davis and Davis, 2004; 
Windham, 2000). Variable payments also characterize the largest single contest, denoted number 83 in 
Figure 2, which promises up to $1.5 billion in an Advance Market Commitment (AMC) to purchase 
vaccines against childhood pneumococcal diseases (GAVI Alliance, 2007; Berndt et al., 2006). In both 
cases, a winner’s payment would depend on the number of units deployed, thereby offering an important 
kind of reward for incremental success over and above the yes/no achievement of particular technical 
criteria. 6 
 
Figure 2. A visual history of technology inducement prizes, 1930-2007 
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3.  WHEN ARE PRIZES NEEDED? A NEW TYPOLOGY OF INNOVATIONS AND 
FUNDING INSTRUMENTS 
Considering the prizes described above and listed in Table A1, the historical experience raises the 
question of what situations best suit prizes versus other funding mechanisms. Kalil (2006) proposes a list 
of comparative advantages and drawbacks of inducement prizes. Here, we summarize the extensive 
economics literature on this question, applying a new typology of innovations and matching each with the 
payment mechanisms used to fund them.  
Figure 3 presents four categories of innovations and their typical funding mechanisms. The 
technologies that benefit most from prizes fall in the bottom-right corner of this classification. The two 
columns correspond to the source of funding; the first column contains innovations that are typically 
funded by for-profit private investors, while the second contains innovations that are typically funded by 
governments or philanthropic donors. The label at the top of each column indicates the type of funder, 
while the label at the bottom suggests the kinds of technology these funders are likely to be able to 
support. All desirable innovations, in either column, create value for their beneficiaries above the cost of 
R&D. However, in order for the innovation to be funded on a for-profit basis, and hence fall in the left 
column, it must be a type of technology for which a sufficient share of value can be captured (through 
market sales or licensing) for the funder of the R&D to recoup their investment. Value capture is typically 
easier for innovations that are embodied in goods and services that can be sold or rented, unit by unit, 
while excluding potential beneficiaries who might not be able or willing to pay for its benefits. Even for 
excludable technologies, however, much of the value created by innovation cannot be captured by the 
innovators, even with strong intellectual property protection. For example, Nordhaus (2004) estimates 
that innovators in the US economy captured less than 5 percent of the total value created by new 
technologies during the period 1948-2001.  
The most important determinant of excludability, and hence the potential for value capture, is the 
innovator’s physical ability to prevent non-payers from benefiting. Easy exclusion of non-payers, 
sometimes called “natural excludability,” is a characteristic of many technologies embodied in physical 
products (e.g. machinery, chemicals and medicines); these technologies would typically be found in the 
left-hand column of Figure 3.  
A second source of excludability involves legal IPRs. The legal right to sue an imitator may 
facilitate value capture and excludability, but enforcement may be sufficiently costly that benefits remain 
non-excludable despite strong IPR legislation. For example, in the US we observe much more private 
investment in maize breeding than wheat breeding. The two plant types face the same IPR regimes, but 
hybridization of maize gives it natural excludability, whereas improved wheat remains open-pollinated. 
Therefore, a maize breeder can readily sell hybrid seed while keeping the genetic material proprietary, 
thereby earning a profit on their intellectual property. A wheat breeder, in contrast, has much less ability 
to capture value in this way; the genetic material of an improved seed becomes easily accessible once the 
seed is sold, and it is prohibitively expensive to pursue infringers.  
A third and more subtle determinant of excludability involves market structure, which determines 
who benefits from productivity gains. In competitive markets with inelastic demand, for example, much 
of the economic value from productivity gains will be transferred to consumers through lower prices. This 
kind of value creation cannot readily be captured by innovators, but it can be recouped by governments 
through consumer taxation. The pursuit of such cost and price reduction is a major factor explaining why 
agricultural innovation tends to be government-funded, whereas products that are sold in less competitive 
markets or that face more elastic demand tend to attract more private R&D (Figure 3, left-hand column). 
If the benefits of a technology are not excludable, for whatever reason, that technology will be 
unable to sustain for-profit funding. Innovation for these technologies will occur haphazardly (if at all) 
unless it is subject to deliberate funding by governments and philanthropies. Such public funding may 
address a whole field that would otherwise be neglected, such as high-energy physics, or it may focus on 8 
 
the public aspects of a technology that is mostly developed in the private sector, such as automobile safety 
features or medical treatments for extremely poor people.  
The rows in Figure 3 represent the type of funding instrument, in terms of the funder’s choice 
between ex-ante and ex-post payments. Following Wright (1983), the cost-effectiveness of this choice 
depends largely on whether funders can observe the quality of the R&D process before the results are 
known. If R&D performance is observable with clear milestones and quality assurance, the funder can 
effectively target the investment towards a successful innovation, thereby justifying ex-ante payments to 
the innovator. Otherwise, the funder may wait until the results are known before deciding which 
innovator(s) to pay, using ex-post payments or prizes of various kinds. Kremer and Glennester (2004) call 
these “pull” mechanisms, in contrast to the ex-ante “push” mechanisms whereby a funder pays before the 
results are known.  
The rows and columns of Figure 3 create a typology of four kinds of innovation, each 
corresponding to a different kind of funding. This paper is concerned primarily with the second row of 
funding instruments. The bottom-left is a category for profit-seeking, proprietary technology prizes. The 
examples shown in Figure 3 are InnoCentive and NineSigma, two competing web-based marketplaces 
where companies post challenges along with the price they’ll pay to whichever innovator provides the 
best solution. InnoCentive was formed in 2001 under the leadership of drug maker Eli Lilly (InnoCentive, 
2008; Wessel, 2007; Lakhani, 2006), while NineSigma is a similar marketplace founded in 2000, with 
challenges posted by Proctor & Gamble and others. The bottom-right, in contrast, is the category of 
greatest interest to governments and philanthropists. This includes the Advance Market Commitments 
(AMCs) and most of the prizes shown in Figures 1 and 2, such as the famous X Prizes for civilian space 
travel. 
Figure 3. When are prizes needed? 
 
The X Prizes are a series of philanthropically-funded contests initiated in 1995 by Peter 
Diamandis. The first of these was the Ansari X Prize, which offered $10 million to the first privately-
funded firm whose aircraft could carry a pilot plus the weight of two passengers 100 km into space twice 
within two weeks. This prize was won in 2004 by an aviation-design firm led by Burt Rutan, with 
investment from Paul Allen of Microsoft. The funders spent more than twice the value of the prize to win 
it (Schwartz, 2004), and the combined spending of all contestants was perhaps ten times the prize value. 
These investment-to-prize ratios are roughly similar to those elicited by the Orteig prize in the 1920s, on a 
somewhat larger scale in terms of constant dollars. The team that won the Ansari X Prize, however, 
quickly earned much more than the prize itself by licensing the successful technology to Richard 9 
 
Branson’s Virgin Galactica for commercial use, and then earned a many-fold return by selling the entire 
company to Northop Grumman, primarily for use in serving government defense and space contracts.  
The highly visible success of the Ansari X Prize demonstrates that a well-designed contest can 
help kick-start the development of entirely new kinds of technology capable of serving both commercial 
markets and the public sector. But what defines a “well-designed” prize?  Under what circumstances are 
prize contests most successful? 
One fundamental feature of any high-impact prize program is that it posits an achievable but 
difficult goal, as emphasized by Kalil (2006). Timing is key, since the objective is a moving target. 
Technological progress changes achievable possibilities, and socioeconomic conditions influence the 
desirability of those possibilities. The Orteig prize for transatlantic flight, for example, initially attracted 
no contestants; it went unclaimed until it was later renewed and pursued using an improved generation of 
aircraft. The same was seen for prizes aimed at space travel, as an earlier contest for Cheap Access to 
Space (CATS) ended in 2000 with the prize unclaimed (Aldridge, 2004). 
A second fundamental feature of successful prize contests is that they offer a clear measure of 
success, in a field where achievement is desirable but measurement had been lacking. This point is 
emphasized by Newell and Wilson (2005). At the start of civilian aviation, for example, barnstorming 
airplanes would make local demonstrations under diverse conditions, but performance comparisons were 
difficult. The aviation prize contests created well-defined, unambiguously measurable criteria of success. 
These were most successful when they were closely related to actual commercial needs. Orteig’s contest 
for the first transatlantic crossing offered a relatively small prize, as shown in Figure 1, but was extremely 
influential because it provided a clear measure of success in a highly desirable achievement.  
A third feature is that prize contests must make a credible commitment to pay the winner, and 
must employ impartial judges. The need for credible commitment is a key focus of Kremer and 
Glennerster (2004). Without commitment and impartiality, the prize will attract less investment from 
contestants, and success in the contest will be a less useful signal of achievement. One way to overcome 
the credibility constraint is to set prize criteria just slightly ahead of current technology, so that relatively 
small sums can be disbursed quickly. Proposals for an Advanced Market Commitment (AMC) that 
involves long time lags and large sums have had great difficulty establishing credibility, as emphasized by 
Maurer (2005).  
However, although these three features can help make prizes successful, even successful prizes 
do not stand alone. The very definition of success is that prizes leverage other funds by providing a 
measurable benchmark for identifying achievements that are valuable to others. Prize winners may pursue 
commercial sales of their technology for excludable applications (such as the space tourism offered by 
Virgin Galactica using the X Prize-winning techniques), or pursue government contracts for non-
excludable applications (such the largely defense-related aviation offered by Northup Grumman).  
The above-described advantages apply to prizes that are implemented under appropriate 
conditions; in reality, most traditional prize contests have serious limitations. These limitations help 
explain why, once a prize has been won, further R&D for that kind of technology is typically funded 
through grants and contracts instead of additional ex-post prizes. As shown historically from the data in 
Figures 1 and 2 and listed in Table A1, technology prizes have typically been offered alone or in bursts of 
prizes in related areas, as part of a search for breakthroughs in particular fields. Once a field is well 
enough established, it grows through other funding mechanisms. This observation begs the question of 
why technology prizes are not used even more often than they are. In other words, based on observable 
outcomes, why doesn’t every corporate R&D program promote “open innovation” competitions such as 
those offered through InnoCentive and NineSigma? The results shown in Figure 3 suggest that when 
research quality is observable ex-ante, funding will occur ex-ante:  the funders will have no reason to wait 
until a result is observed before they make a grant or contract with a particular innovator whose success is 
visible only ex-post. But why is this?  The historical fact that funders repeatedly choose ex-ante grants 
and contracts implies that there must be disadvantages to contests with ex-post payments.  
One well-known disadvantage of contests with ex-post payments is inherent to any competition 
for a fixed prize. This problem is described in the innovation literature as a “patent race” (Loury 1979, 10 
 
with application to agriculture in Oehmke 1999 and others). The problem arises because contestants may 
use similar methods, thereby duplicating each other’s efforts. The patent race problem implies that 
funders should generally use the easiest available method to find out who or what is likely to succeed, and 
then issue direct grants and contracts to those groups or techniques having the highest likelihood of 
success. 
Another set of disadvantages is associated with the specific design of prize contests. By 
specifying a particular threshold for achievement, prize contests give no incentive for incremental 
improvements other than crossing that threshold, and prize results give no information about performance 
that could have been achieved using more or less ambitious goals. More subtly, by specifying a narrow 
target for achievement, prizes fail to provide information about contestants who could or have reached 
different but related targets.  
Can careful prize designs overcome these limitations?  If contests were designed to offer ex-post 
rewards for incremental achievements of a more varied nature, they could potentially overcome these 
constraints and benefit funders more than the traditional winner-take-all prize strategy. Such prize 
rewards could overcome the zero-sum problem of patent races for narrowly-defined achievement, and 
elicit efforts toward or information about relative success using a much wider range of technologies. To 
promote a successful competition, however, these prize rewards would have to retain the three 
characteristics described above:  a feasible but difficult objective, a clearly measurable goal, and prizes 
that are disbursed in a predictable manner by an impartial authority.  
In the following section, we look inside the universe of ex-post prizes by examining a new 
typology of conditions and assessing which prize designs might be most useful in each case. This 
typology shows how the new category, called “prize rewards,” differs from other prize designs, and helps 




4.  A TYPOLOGY OF PRIZE MECHANISMS: CONTEXT AND MOTIVATION FOR A 
NEW DESIGN 
Figure 4 (below) presents a typology of prize contests. The key characteristics of the technology are 
shown on the horizontal axis, while methods of measuring success are shown on the vertical axis. This 
classification includes some blank cells that represent combinations of characteristics for which no 
examples are available at this time. The bottom-right cell shows the characteristics that apply to the new 
prize rewards concept that was first introduced in Masters (2003, 2005). 
Figure 4. A new typology of prize design 
 
The top row shows one of the oldest kinds of prize, in which success is measured subjectively as 
a matter of expert opinion. The example shown is the Nobel Prizes, but readers will be familiar with many 
juried contests of this type. Almost every organization offers some kind of meritorious service or 
achievement award. These types of prizes are useful for promoting many kinds of desirable innovation 
that cannot be objectively measured.  
The second row applies to prize contests where success is measured as a discrete event. These 
yes/no achievements are typically structured as either first-to-achieve contests or as best-entry 
competitions. The prizes may include first, second and third place awards, all of which are defined as 
lump sum, winner-take-all payments. The example shown is the X Prizes, but this category applies to 
almost all traditional prizes shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
The third row applies to prizes in which increments of success can be measured, and therefore 
may be rewarded incrementally. The example shown is the new AMC for vaccines, but an earlier case 
would be the SERP for energy-efficient refrigerators, in which companies able to sell additional units 
would receive additional payments. This feature of some prizes is crucial to overcoming the zero-sum 
conflict in patent races, by making the competition a positive-sum game with incremental rewards for 
incremental efforts made to expand the market.  
An especially interesting combination of characteristics arises in the bottom-right corner of 
Figure 4, which shows prizes in which the funder chooses a continuous measure of impact, and pays 
proportionally to success. In these contests, the characteristics of winning technologies remain to be 
discovered based on the contestants’ innovative efforts, and those efforts are rewarded incrementally. To 
combine these characteristics, the sponsor of a proportional prize rewards contest could offer a fixed sum 
to be divided among numerous contestants, in proportion to their success along the chosen measure of 
impact.  12 
 
5.  IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPORTIONAL PRIZES: PRIZE REWARDS FOR 
AFRICAN AGRICULTURE 
As shown in our typology of prize mechanisms, proportional prize rewards could be a useful mechanism 
for spurring innovation wherever funders have an objective and verifiable measure of impact, and 
recognize that the goal could be achieved by a variety of innovators using various techniques that succeed 
to varying degrees. Many fields might offer such circumstances. For example, one might consider prize 
rewards for innovation in education, where improvements in students’ test scores might be a criterion 
used for proportional rewards to teachers and schools, thereby identifying and rewarding the most 
successful educational techniques. Energy efficiency could also be rewarded in this way, with prize 
rewards proportional to increases in the efficiency of transportation, heating and cooling, or other tasks.  
With proportional prizes, a key concern is whether the impact measure really gauges incremental 
success in a useful way, and whether the characteristics of successful technologies are truly unpredictable. 
If these criteria are not met, it is preferable to offer traditional prizes, or to use other funding mechanisms. 
However the stated criteria seem to arise occasionally, in particular with regard to the innovations needed 
to raise productivity in African agriculture.  
As documented in Masters (2005), the limitations of existing funding mechanisms have left the 
productivity levels of African agriculture well below those of other regions. Low productivity is a 
significant cause of continued poverty and malnutrition. The United Kingdom’s Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights (2002) concluded that developing countries cannot rely simply on patent 
protection, and there is a need for a better system that orients research toward the needs of poor farmers. 
Kremer and Zwane (2005) suggest an approach modeled on the AMC, which presupposes that agriculture 
offers vaccine-like opportunities for a “one disease, one cure” type of technology. We argue that most 
agricultural innovation falls in the bottom-right rather than the bottom-left cell of Figure 4, because value 
creation can be measured ex-post more easily than it can be predicted ex-ante.  
The value created by new agricultural techniques is highly measurable, because innovations can 
be subject to randomized field trials that measure unit gains between the old and new techniques, farm 
surveys may be used to measure the number of new versus old units in use, and market observations may 
be used to identify the prices at which outputs and inputs are being bought and sold. The observed 
quantities times prices can then be used as a reasonable measure of value creation in each year, and the 
discounted total value over time allows us to compute the value created by a new technology in a 
particular region over a given time period. This value creation is economically measurable, even though it 
is not entirely captured in financial profits for the seller. Much of the gain accrues to consumers in the 
form of lower prices, and to the technology’s imitators in the form of technology spillovers. Of course the 
details of measurement are open to question, but in principle, value creation is observable and auditable 
after the fact, and is clearly linked to the innovation’s value for society. Furthermore, the same 
measurement approach can apply to a wide range of technologies, whenever and wherever they are used, 
and whatever their mode of operation, as long as the technology affects the quantities of observable 
outputs and inputs having prices that can be inferred from observable market prices. In many cases, the 
item itself may be produced and consumed on the farm without actually being bought or sold, but an 
upper or lower bound on its value can be approximated by the price of a substitute product on local 
markets.  
Agricultural technologies that create value are very diverse and often quite hard to predict. A 
funder may believe that disease resistance, drought tolerance, fertilizer response, yield variability, product 
quality, storage losses or other characteristics are particularly important, but the feasibility and 
performance of a breakthrough in any area remains unknown until it is actually observed on farms. 
Agricultural productivity relies on interactions among dozens of useful species, against a myriad of 
biological, physical and social constraints. Even blockbuster breakthroughs, such as semi-dwarf wheat, 
hybrid maize, or transgenic sources of insect resistance, require endless localized adaptation. In general, 
improvements that overcome one constraint soon encounter another. There is no equivalent to the “one 13 
 
problem, one solution” paradigm that often applies in other fields. Productivity growth is driven by the 
continuous deployment of many locally-adapted innovations, each of which is soon replaced by 
something better.  
For all of these reasons, improvement in African agriculture is a good candidate for 
implementation of proportional prizes. The way this might work is represented in Figure 5, as a sequence 
of four steps forming a virtuous circle to leverage other investments and accelerate innovation.  
Figure 5. Implementation of the prize rewards approach 
 
The first step shown in Figure 5 consists of donors offering a fixed sum of money, for example $1 
million per year, to be divided among those responsible for developing and disseminating the most 
successful new technologies observed on farmers’ fields in West Africa. Note that such a sum would be a 
tiny fraction of what is now being spent on grants and contracts in this domain. Masters (2005) 
documents the evolution of total expenditure on African agricultural R&D, which is now over $1 billion 
per year. 
The second step occurs when innovators, responding to the funder’s offer, assemble data on their 
technologies to document an application for prize rewards. These data are defined as at least one 
controlled experiment showing output and input quantities using the new technology, at least one farm 
survey showing the use extent of the new technology, and market prices showing the value of each output 
or input. As described in Masters (2006), this experimental dataset is typically needed to guide the R&D 
process itself, and the farm survey and price data are needed to guide dissemination. These data are 
entirely observable, they refer to real events, and reporting them does not require any of the ex-ante 
projections or accounting and management skills needed for forward-looking proposals. The submitted 
prize applications are then audited, and the verified data are used in simple spreadsheets that multiply 
quantities times price to estimate the total value added. In the example shown in Figure 5, a total of seven 
applicants might come forward with data documenting a total impact of $36 million. (These numbers are 
not arbitrary; they are discussed in more detail below.) 
The third step occurs when the submitted data are subjected to on-site audits by the prize 
secretariat, and the donors disburse payments to the winning portfolio of techniques in proportion to the 
verified impact of each. To ensure the accuracy of applicants’ data, the prize authority must send analysts 
to inspect the experiment sites, interview technicians regarding the validity of controlled experiments, and 14 
 
interview local farmers regarding the validity of adoption data. The cost of such audits depends on the 
number of site visits and the intensity of the auditing effort. A balance must be struck between award 
amounts and audit costs; the prize sponsor should spend just enough on audits to ensure the credibility of 
their awards. In the example shown, if the entire $36 million in measured gains is accepted by the 
secretariat, each of the seven innovators would receive 1/36
th of their technology’s measured gains in 
“prize rewards.” In essence, they would be given a 2.8 percent royalty on the value created by their 
innovation.  
The impact of the intervention is felt in a fourth step, when other investors, innovators and 
adopters use the information disclosed in prize announcements to scale up and spread the winning 
techniques. Some of the winning technologies might involve excludable technologies, such as hybrid 
maize or vegetables for export; these would be scaled up commercially by for-profit firms. Other winning 
technologies could exist inherently in the public domain, such as a new storage or organic pest-control 
technique; these would be scaled up by public or NGO agencies through government or philanthropic 
support.  
Proportional prizes could be awarded for achievement towards any kind of observable goal that is 
subject to cardinal measurement. In the case of agricultural innovation, step two of the described cycle 
calls for measuring the net present value of social gains from technology adoption. This can be done 
readily using a standard impact assessment methodology refined in training workshops for African 
research managers, as detailed online at www.agecon.purdue.edu/staff/masters/impact.  
Figures 6, 7 and 8 below illustrate our approach for measuring the value of agricultural 
innovations in Africa. For each kind of observation, we show the letter used on the figure, and how the 
estimate would be obtained for entry in a spreadsheet whose formulas follow the calculations shown in 
the figures. The only variables needed to estimate value are:  
a)  an output and input change per unit of production, which roughly corresponds to a “yield 
change” but can involve any kind of quantity to be measured using controlled experiments;  
b)  an adoption rate and local prices for output and inputs, shown as P on Figure 6, to be 
obtained using a household survey among actual and potential adopters;  
c)  total production in the adoption domain (Q) which can be obtained from survey or census 
data;  
d)  the change in output supply from adoption (J), obtained by combining a), b) and c); and 
e)  the change in input costs from adoption (I ), also obtained by combining a), b) and c).  
Note that each variable may be verified locally through random site visits by the prize secretariat 
staff. Figure 6 illustrates how these data relate to a standard supply-demand diagram, and how they permit 
the computation of net cost reduction (shown as K on the diagram). Having subtracted the change in input 
costs (I), including payments for marketed inputs as well as labor or other non-marketed inputs, the value 
of K over all Q is proportional to the economic surplus gain accruing to farmers and consumers. The 
value of K times Q is exactly equal to economic surplus gain when supply elasticity is unity and the 
demand elasticity is zero. Using other elasticities would have the advantage of giving deservedly greater 
weight to innovations that raise productivity where supply is more inelastic, but would have the 
disadvantage of relying on data that are not easily verifiable; thus, in order to maintain transparency in 
this context, it is preferable to use the simpler rule by which total estimated gains are equal to the area K 
times Q. 15 
 
Figure 6. Data needed to estimate the annual value of an innovation 
The data discussed so far refer to a single year. However, it could be desirable to allow forward 
projection of three additional years of continued benefit, to limit the frequency with which a given 
research program would need to apply for prizes. Similarly, it might be useful to include a “statute of 
limitations” disallowing benefits for innovations that were initially disseminated more than five years 
prior to the date of application, in order to limit claims for historical events. Thus, prize applicants would 
typically be making a single application for up to eight years of adoption benefits, the magnitude of which 
might be estimated with just one or two farm surveys, as illustrated in Figure 7 below. 












Projection (max. 3 yrs.)
Application 
date  
The annual data presented in Figures 6 and 7 would have to be aggregated into a single year, as 
illustrated in Figure 8.  
 








Variables and data sources
Market data
P,Q National agricultural statistics 
Field data
J Yield   change   ×  adoption rate 
I  Input change per unit 
Economic parameters
K Supply elasticity (= 1 to omit) 




Figure 8. Computation of net present value as of application date 
An example of the results of these calculations is presented in Table 1 below, showing an entire 
dataset that might be used in application for prize rewards. The example provides a concrete illustration 
of a particular set of prize rewards that might result from the four-step process illustrated in Figure 5. The 
results shown were compiled using the same data definitions and spreadsheet calculations that would be 
required for the prize application, with data drawn from many of the groups who would be likely to apply. 
These calculations were done as part of a series of workshops in which West African researchers were 
invited to present their own data on their most successful technologies, using the impact-assessment 
methodology described in Masters (1996) and Masters and Ly (2002).  





(NPV in US$) 
Measured 




1. Cotton in Senegal  14,109,528  39.2%  392,087 
2. Cotton in Chad  6,676,421  18.6%  185,530 
3. Rice in Sierra Leone  6,564,255  18.2%  182,413 
4. Rice in Guinea Bissau  4,399,644  12.2%  122,261 
5. Zai in Burkina Faso  2,695,489  7.5%  74,904 
6. Cowpea storage in Benin  1,308,558  3.6%  36,363 
7. Fish processing in Senegal  231,810  0.6%  6,442 
Total  $35.99 m.  100%  $1 m. 
Note: With payment of $1 million for measured gains of about $36 million, the implied royalty rate is approximately 1/36 = 2.78 
percent of measured gains. 
The data in Table 1 represent the researchers’ measurements of their own program’s impacts. In 
order to qualify for prize rewards, the data would be subjected to audit, and might prove to differ from the 





NPV at application date, 









came from cotton improvement in Senegal. This innovation involved the introduction of a set of seed 
varieties and related pest-control techniques developed by the Senegalese Institute for Agricultural 
Research (ISRA), a national research agency, and disseminated through public-private partnerships in the 
1990s. The data show that these efforts generated about $14 m. in value creation over eight years. These 
gains were spread among smallholder farmers, input suppliers and cotton buyers. If all of the data in 
Table 1 were to survive audit, the gain would correspond to 39.2 percent of total measured gains, meaning 
that the ISRA and its partners would receive a royalty-like payment of $392,087 from this round of prize 
rewards. Those responsible for the other techniques shown on the table would receive smaller payments, 
as shown in the right-hand column. 
A key feature of the prize rewards approach is its similarity to a real marketplace, in that all 
qualified groups and individuals receive payment, but the amounts vary according to how well the various 
buyers’ needs are met. In this case, the values shown in Table 1 can be seen as the market share or 
portfolio weight of each innovation, measuring the degree to which it contributes to the prize sponsor’s 
overall objective of creating value in African agriculture. In the case shown above, each innovation 
earned its place in a different way, and the costs of achieving the gains varied widely. Future investors 
seeking to scale up each prize-winning innovation must consider the cost of replication. In this case, the 
top four innovations involve genetic improvement, which typically has a large fixed cost but low marginal 
cost. However, yield improvement through the selection of new varieties is not the only channel for 
agricultural innovation. The other three prize winners involve other kinds of technological change:  the 
dissemination of zai microcatchments for soil and water conservation in Burkina Faso, the use of sealed 
containers for cowpea storage in Benin, and improved techniques for artisanal fish processing in Senegal 
using cinderblock ovens (fours parpaing).  
The data needed to document success typically include information from controlled experiments 
conducted during the development phase, combined with information from household and market surveys 
used to monitor dissemination. The assembly of these data requires cooperation between the R&D 
institution conducting the controlled experiments (such as a government or private research agency) and a 
dissemination agency with associated field staff (such as a local NGO or farm input supplier). However, 
the prize reward application requires only outcome data, meaning that it is relatively easy to form the 
necessary partnerships, usually through an agreement to share data in exchange for sharing the resulting 
prize payment. As in other negotiations, the result is likely to be a simple division that splits the award 
into halves, thirds or other fractions. Such payments would be much simpler to manage than the payments 
involved in traditional donor-funded projects, and would typically be a small fraction of the total revenue 
of the prize-winning organizations. Many entities, including international agricultural research centers 
and multinational companies, might contribute data to a prize application without claiming a share of the 
payment, simply to demonstrate the impact of their work. As with all of the prizes described herein, the 
applicants are generally far more concerned with the reputation gained by winning rather than the actual 
prize money itself. The cash is an important signal of value, however, and would come to the recipient as 
unrestricted revenue. In this way, the gain parallels the income from sale of a product– or, more precisely, 
royalties received on the social gains from technology adoption. 
The payments in Table 1, following the steps shown in Figure 5, could spark a virtuous circle in 
which prize rewards might be offered repeatedly year after year. The rewards would remain a small 
fraction of total innovation funding, yet would be extremely valuable as long as each year’s winning 
portfolio of successful innovations included surprises that were not predictable ex-ante, and that 
subsequently attract investment because they won a share of the prize. The proportionality of the awards 
is important, with each year’s prize allocation acting similar to market shares or portfolio weights. Even 
receipt of a small prize can help an innovation be scaled up, if replication can be achieved at a 
correspondingly low cost. The wide range of innovations shown in Table 1 demonstrates how a prize 
program could showcase all kinds of new technology throughout the food and agricultural sector. The 
only constraint for eligibility is that gains be measurable, as described above.  
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6.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper provides a history and typology of innovation incentives, thereby identifying a combination of 
circumstances under which alternative mechanisms and particularly a new kind of prize payment could 
help accelerate and guide the innovation process. The new approach involves royalty-like prize rewards 
that would be paid in proportion to measured impact. This mechanism allows a donor to pay only for 
results, without pre-specifying who or what is likely to be most successful. The example given shows 
how this approach would work for agricultural technologies in Africa.  Similar instruments could 
potentially be developed to spur innovation in other sectors, such as to improve outcomes in education or 
raise energy efficiency.  
In summary, the effectiveness of innovation funding depends on choosing the right instrument for 
each situation—and perhaps, in some situations, developing a new instrument that is specifically suited to 
the task. Prizes are distinctive in that they are additional and temporary sources of funding, they are used 
when needed to elicit additional effort, and they can reveal the most successful approaches for reaching a 
particular goal. For this reason, a relatively small amount of funding in a well-designed prize program can 




Table A.1. Dataset of major technology prizes, 1700-2007 
   Prize Goal  Period 
Prize 








Discovery of a method to find 
longitude at sea 
1567 - ?  6000 gold 








year life span. 






Longitude at Sea  
Reliable way to find longitude 
at sea 
1714-1773 Up  to 
£20,000 
$2,087,000 
b Government  of 
the UK  
Longitude Board  John Harrison  
3 
Premium for an 
Invention to Stop 
the Progress of 
Fires 
Best invention for stopping the 
progress of fires 
1734-1761  20,000 
crowns 






Prize for Sugar 
from Native Plants 




20 ducats  $57













Artificial means of producing 
alkali soda 
1775–1789 2,400  livres  $13,000








Prize for Food 
Preservation 
Techniques 
Technique for preserving food 
in bottles 
1795-1810 12,000  francs  $44,000
e Government  of 
France 
(Napoleon) 




Nicolas Appert  
7 
Prize for a Flax 
Spinning Machine 
Invention of the best machine 















Table A.1. Continued 
   Prize Goal  Period 
Prize 






Art of Piercing or 
Boring Artesian 
Wells Prize 
Best manual, or practical and 
elementary upon the art of 
piercing or boring Artesian 
wells with the miner's or 
fountaineer's augur, from 25 
meters to 100 meters depth, and 
deeper if possible 
1818-1821 3,000  francs  $11,000













Without a Paddle 
Wheel 
Best suggestion on propelling 
vessels without paddle wheels 






Turbine Prize  Development of a large scale 
commercial hydraulic turbine 
1823-1827 6,000  francs  $26,500 











Apple and Pear 
Prize 
Improve the fruits from apple 
and pear trees 
1826-1847 1,000  francs  $4,500
e Royal 
Horticulture 
Society of Paris 
Royal 
Horticulture 
Society of Paris 
Unclaimed 
12 




Develop a machine capable of 
removing obstacles to 
navigation 











Build a locomotive weighing 
less than six tons that could pull 
a load of 20 tons at 10 miles per 
hour 











Premium for a 
Substitute for 
Quinine 
Artificially prepare the sulphate 
of quinine 
1849 - ?  4,000 francs  $25,500
f Society  of 









Best design for a "self-righting" 
lifeboat with eight desired 
features 








Discovery of a manure equal in 
fertilizing properties to 
Peruvian Guano 











Table A.1. Continued 
   Prize Goal  Period 
Prize 






Breant Prize  Cure for cholera  1854 - now  100,000 
francs 
$593,500 











Invention of a screw propeller 
for the Royal Navy 










Best new marble-sawing 
machine 




Destruction of the 
Bothrops 
Lanceolatus 
Destroy this serpent, endemic 
to the island of Martinique 








The Billiard Ball 
Prize 
Find a suitable substitute for 
ivory to make billiard balls 









Design a machine that could 
separate the fiber from the 

















Phylloxera Prize  Find a cure for the wine blight 
(Phylloxera) 
1870 - ?  20,000 francs 




$75,000 from 1870 



















Horses and Other 
Animals 
Machine propelled by steam or 
other agent able to complete a 
200-mile route at no less than 5 
mph and to plow and pull 
loaded wagons 




Two crews split 




Cure or prevention of cattle 
plague 










Table A.1. Continued 
   Prize Goal  Period 
Prize 







Development of a practicable, 
self propelling road carriage 




J. Frank Duryea 
27 
Francois Joseph 
Audiffred Prize for 
a Tuberculosis 
Remedy 
Finding a curative or preventive 




f Académie  de 























Deutsch Prize  Fly between Aero-club de 
France and Eiffel Tower and 




f  Henri Deutsch de 
la Meurthe 
Henri Deutsch 






Fly a heavier-than-air vehicle 




f Ernest  Archdeacon 
and Henry Deutsch 








Texas Boll Weevil 
Eradication Prize 
Invention of a practical remedy 
or device for eradicating the 
boll weevil 




First airplane in America to fly 
1 km 













only DM75,000 = 
$54,500) 
Paul Wolfskehl   Göttingen 
Academy  
Andrew Wiles  
34 
The Daily Mail 
English Channel 
Prize 




Fly across Alps from 
Switzerland to Italy 
1910 160,000  lire  $665,500 
h     Milan 
Committee 
Prize 
Gorges Chavez 23 
 
Table A.1. Continued 
   Prize Goal  Period 
Prize 







Prize for a Cheap 
Alternative to 
Gasoline 
Best fuel other than gasoline 
capable of being used in 
internal combustion engines 














Cross the Atlantic non-stop  1913-1919  £10,000  $1,022,500  The Daily Mail  The Daily Mail  John Alcock & 
Arthur Brown 
38  Hearst Prize  Cross continental US in 30 
days 
1919  $50,000  $582,500  William Hearst  William Hearst  Unclaimed 
39 
Orteig Prize   Fly non-stop from New York to 
Paris (or vice versa) 






Australia Air Race 
Flight from England to 

















112 m. rubles 
until 1940 
$165,755,500 













begin with – 
raised to 
10,000 marks 
$23,500 in 1933 
























and team.  
44 
Kremer Prize for 
Human Powered 
Flight  
Human-powered flight across 
the English Channel 





and team.  
45 
Kremer Prize for 
Human Powered 
Flight  
Human-powered flight on a 
1.5-mile triangular course in 
under 3 minutes 
1959 - now  £20,000  $388,000  Henry Kremer  Royal 
Aeronautical 
Society  




Table A.1. Continued 
   Prize Goal  Period 
Prize 






Kremer Prize for 
Human Powered 
Flight  
Human-powered flight on a 26-
mile long course in under an 
hour 
















Feynman Prizes   Development of first motor less 
than 1/64th of an inch on every 
side 





Fredkin Prize  First computer chess program 
to beat a reigning world chess 
champion 




Sikorsky Prize  Design and fly a human-
powered helicopter for at least 
60 seconds at a height of 3 m 









Find a cure for some form of 
cancer in the following decade 




Loebner Prize   Computer that can pass the 
Turing test 
1990 - now  $100,000 

















No winner so 





First person to factorize one of 
the listed semi-prime numbers 
1991-2007  from $100 to 
$200,000 






100-nm robot arm and 50-nm 
computing device that 
demonstrates ability to build 
nano tech computer 










Highly efficient, CFC-free 
refrigerator 
1994-1997 $30,000,000  $40,810,000  24  Utilities 
comprising SERP  
SERP Board   Whirlpool 
Corporation  25 
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   Prize Goal  Period 
Prize 








for Rapid STD 
Diagnostic Test  
Rapid and inexpensive point of 
care STD diagnostic test  






Ansari X PRIZE   Commercially developed 
manned flight to 100-km 
altitude, twice in two weeks 






Budweiser Cup  First non-stop balloon flight 
around the globe 








CATS Prize   Inexpensive commercial launch 
of payload into space  









Computer program that can 
beat human at the game of Go  
Late 1990s 
– now 









Proof of Beal's Conjecture  1997 - now  $100,000  $125,500 Andrew  Beal  Andrew Beal  Unclaimed 


















One winner for 
a million-digit 
prime number 




Best gold prospecting methods 
or estimates 









($1 m. each) 









Finding answers to problems 
that need specific solutions 
2001-now  Various 
amounts 







Table A.1. Continued 
   Prize Goal  Period 
Prize 








Improve robotics in vehicles  2003-now  $1m. (2003), 




















Demonstrate slowing of ageing 










Great Cane Toad 
Trap Competition 
Design a trap to catch the 
highly poisonous Cane Toads 
2004-2005  $16,000  + 
$1,000 for 
each of the 
other 5 
finalists 
$22,500 The  Northern 
Territory 
Government and 





































Development of economical 
filtration devices for the 
removal of arsenic from well 
water in developing countries 





















Reliable and duplicatable way 
to boot Windows XP on a Mac 
with an Intel processor 






Currently seven bounties on 
creation of applications for use 
on the OSD 
2006-  $500-$1000  $500-$1000  Neuros OSD  Neuros OSD  No known 
winner 27 
 
Table A.1. Continued 
   Prize Goal  Period 
Prize 






Archon X PRIZE 
for genomics 
Successful sequencing of 100 
human genomes in 10 days 
2006-
present 
$10,000,000 $10,000,000  Dr.  Craig  Venter 






Prize4Life Prize  Finding a verifiable biomarker 
that could allow early diagnosis 
of ALS (Lou Gehrig's disease) 
2006-2008 $1,000,000  $1,000,000  Prize4Life  Prize4Life  Unclaimed 
76 
The Netflix Prize  Improve the company's 
recommendation system by 
10% 





Prove or disprove Wolfram's 
conjecture that a particular 2-
state, 3-color "Turing machine" 
could function as a universal 
purpose computer 






Design a wearable electric 
power system providing 96 
hours of equipment operation at 
less than half the current weight 
(almost 20 lbs) 












Prize for Faster 
Airport Security 
Technology 
Deploy security land 
technology in an airport to 
increase throughput by 15% or 
more 




Design a computer lab adapted 
to local needs that can be built 
in communities around the 
world 












Invention of energy-efficient 
lamps (three categories) 
2007 - now  $20,000,000 
total for the 
three 
categories 
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   Prize Goal  Period 
Prize 









Space flight vehicle completing 
at least three Earth orbits at 
minimum altitude of 400 km 
with a minimum capacity of 
three people 
2007 - now  approx 
$100,000,000 
$100,000,000 Aeronautics  and 
Space Prize Act 
Aeronautics and 





Development of a new vaccine 
for pneumococcal disease 
2007 - now  $1.5 billion 
in the fund; 
payments 
depend on  
sales 
$1.5 billion  Canada, Italy, 
Norway, Russia, 
UK and Gates 
Foundation 





Commercially viable design 
that results in the removal of 
anthropogenic, atmospheric 
greenhouse gases 
2007 - now  $25,000,000  $25,000,000  Virgin Group  Virgin Group 
and a committee 
of five judges 
Unclaimed 
85 
Unlock the Value 
Prize 
Increase the silver yield of the 
Barrick Gold Corporation's 
Veladero mine in Argentina 








Transport a five-person crew 
into orbit for 60 days, twice 






Google Lunar X 
PRIZE 
Land a robot on the surface of 
the Moon, travel 500 meters 
over the lunar surface, and send 
images and data back to the 
Earth 
Announced 




First prize $20 
m. (falls to $15 
m. in 2013); 
second prize 




Jan 1, 2013 
Google X  Prize 
Foundation 
Unclaimed 
88  Automotive X 
PRIZE 
Production-capable vehicle that 
exceed 100 MPG equivalent 






PETA in vitro 
meat prize 
Produce commercially viable in 
vitro chicken 









Notes: All sources are listed in references. Shaded prizes are not shown in Figures 1 and 2. When currency conversions are necessary, we convert into US dollars before applying inflation 
to determine current values of prizes. Exchange rates are from Officer (2007a, 2007b), except as noted below. The 2006 values in US dollars are determined using the CPI time series 
available online at www.measuringworth.com (Officer and Williamson, 2006) for the time period 1790-2006. 
In the conversions from 18th and 19th century currencies into dollars, we use the value of gold in the coins as a lower bound on the currency value. 29 
 
Table A.1. Notes Continued 
a) One Spanish ducat weighs 0.1125 troy ounce in gold which equals 3.4969 g or 0.12335 ounce of gold. Using a value of gold of $20.97 per ounce between 1837 and 1933, we determine 
that 1 Spanish ducat = $2.404 in 1790. 
b) From Officer and Williamson (2006), £4.25 corresponded to one ounce of gold in 1717. Hence, £20,000 weighed 4,705 ounces in gold. With a gold price of $19.49 per ounce in 1790, 
the prize is equivalent to $91,717 in 1790 and $2,086,938 in 2006. 
c) One Dutch ducat weighed 3.51 grams of gold = 0.1238 g of gold. Based on the earliest dollar value of gold that we were able to find, $19.49 per ounce of gold, 1 Dutch ducat = $2.413 
in 1786. 
d)  Based on the Louis d'Or "au bandeau", French coin worth 24 livres from 1726 until 1785. The coin weighed 8.158 g in gold (Aubin, 2001). Based on a gold price of $19.49 per ounce 
in 1790 (earliest date available), 1 livre = $0.2336 in 1790.  
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